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Introduction 
This short case study has been produced in order to contribute to the NCR’s aim of 
supporting community resilience. The intention is that some insights into the lessons from 
hurricane Katrina and the emergency response to it, have merit for Scotland, and for ongoing 
efforts to increase community resilience to natural hazards.  This brief document is designed 
to support Government in thinking about the adequacy of current policy as it relates to 
resilience and to support local agencies and communities to consider how they might operate 
and the adequacy of their operation were they to be adversely affected by a similarly 
devastating natural event. 
 
Hurricane Katrina 
On the 29th August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf of Mexico (Rodriguez, 
Trainor, & Quarantelli, 2006), culminating in a set of disastrous conditions across several 
cities of the United States (US), but particularly in New Orleans. The destruction took the 
form of a storm surge and the generation of flood waters that led to the subsequent failure of 
protective flood gates and levees. Katrina, known to be one of the five deadliest storms in the 
History of US (Blake, Rappaport, Jarrell, Landsea, & Center, 2007), killed several hundred 
people (Sharkey, 2007), caused damage worth billions of dollars (Burby, 2006), and left more 
than one million people homeless (T. E. Davis, Grills-Taquechel, & Ollendick, 2010). There 
was also widespread travel disruption and damage to communication infrastructures that 
inhibited the response effort and generated problems around situational awareness of 
unfolding events at the Federal level (Colten, Kates, & Laska, 2008; Comfort & Haase, 
2006). Local emergency management agencies were, therefore, left to address the issues 
without the immediate Federal assistance that would normally be expected.   
 
A decade later, President Barack Obama, said that: 
“what started out as a natural disaster became a man-made disaster - a failure of 
government to look out for its own citizens” (McCarthy, 2015).  
 
What was clear in the case of Katrina was that the scale of the disaster overwhelmed local 
response capabilities, highlighted the false assumptions that had been built into mitigation 
strategies (especially in terms of the levees), and pointed to the problems that local 
communities, and especially communities in areas of high deprivation, faced when trying to 
respond to the task demands of such an event. Those who had the means to escape and move 
to safer areas were able to do so, leaving many of the poorest people in society to have to 
fend for themselves. It is this that underpinned President Obama’s comments about the failure 
of government; in effect, the events served to further embed and exacerbate existing 
inequalities in society and to make the vulnerable yet more vulnerable. 
 
Enquiries into the Katrina disaster uncovered a number of shortcomings in America’s 
emergency planning and response effort. Some of the prevailing conditions were that levee 
protections around affected cities were not built for the most severe hurricanes; authorities 
overlooked the scale of the potential event via weather warnings; there was late or ineffective 
execution of the national response plans; and many officials lacked appropriate training or 
large-scale disaster management experience. Other factors included the impact of 
management silos (and the associated organisational attitudes) around responsibility – 
departments/agencies considered only their particular role and not the integration of roles and 
collective responsibilities.  This approach hindered the response effort, problems occurred 
around poor media handling due to the fragmented intervention of responsible agencies, and 
ineffective coordination plans led to under-resourced and insufficient medical care and 
evacuation efforts in the aftermath of the disaster. There were also clear weaknesses in 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) procedures for requesting federal 
assistance (Cooper & Block, 2007; Gheytanchi et al., 2007). Investigations also pointed to the 
emphasis on security concerns over safety concerns (notably, but not exclusively, in relation 
to the protection of property) (Cooper & Block, 2007; Farazmand, 2007; Gheytanchi et al., 
2007). For example, of the $1.2 billion funds allocated to emergencies, $1.1 billion was spent 
on counter-terrorism to the neglect of other threats including those from natural hazards 
(Cooper & Block, 2007).  
 
Fitness for Purpose 
America’s disaster preparedness, response, and relief was led by FEMA, the federal agency 
with responsibility for responding to such extreme events (Edwards, 2014).  With FEMA 
being responsible, one might reasonably assume that rules, processes, structures and 
responsibilities were in place for disaster response. The actual response to the disaster 
suggested that this was not the case, despite government attempts to bolster the area. Several 
years prior to Katrina, the US Government had invested in the country’s emergency planning 
and contingency management through establishing a new national response plan, creating the 
department of homeland security, and developing a national incident management system. In 
addition, billions of funds were allocated to the different tiers of governments for emergency 
planning (Cooper & Block, 2007). A year prior to Katrina, government agencies had 
performed a simulation exercise known as “Hurricane Pam” for similar strength of Hurricane 
in New Orleans. This exercise showed that the US government recognized the potential 
occurrence of a category four or five hurricane striking New Orleans and surrounding states.  
 
Despite this preparation, and as the US congress report on Katrina (2006) suggested, the 
“implementation of lessons learned from Hurricane Pam was incomplete” (p2), meaning that 
the US government failed to learn important lessons from the Hurricane Pam and the then 
gap between planning and implementation in organizational practices. Whilst some would 
point to the lack of time between Exercise Pam and Katrina as a justification for the lack of 
effective implementation of the lessons learned, there remains a wider issue about the speed 
at which government agencies respond to policy developments for catastrophic events.  
 
Evidence from the enquiries into Katrina suggested that decision-making was largely 
curtailed by the uncertainty of emerging conditions and yet such uncertainty is likely to be a 
feature of any natural hazard. Problems with the decision making were subsequently 
heightened by the delays and limitations arising from bureaucratic rules and 
responsibilities.(T. Davis, 2006). This could be seen as typical of top-down approaches to 
disaster management. For example, FEMA was criticized for its slow and risk-averse culture 
and its submissiveness to politics (Edwards, 2014), although this is a challenge that faces a 
number of government agencies worldwide. Such a top down approach to disaster 
management, especially when combined with prioritization of security concerns over safety 
concerns, could be seen to generate an ineffective Government response in the recovery 
processes around Katrina.  
 
An Alternative Approach: Considerations for Scotland 
An alternative strategy for disaster management could be seen to involve a more strategic 
investment in a bottom up approach – by empowering local first responders and providing 
sufficient funding and support for local communities. There is an obvious logic in the 
delivery of such an approach. By definition, local emergency responders are managed locally 
and understand the localities affected by a disaster. This situational awareness could be seen 
as important in shaping more effective decision making and performance (Edwards, 2014). In 
the case of Katrina for instance, private and third sector organizations were swift in their 
response and in the provision of relief to those affected in the immediate aftermath of the 
disaster. For example, Red Cross had 239 shelters ready to house tens of thousands of 
evacuees on the day Katrina made landfall, accommodating up to 146,000 evacuees at the 
peak of the evacuation (Edwards, 2014). Similarly, Walmart contributed around $20 million 
in cash, material and food relief and promised a job for all its displaced workers (Forrer, Kee, 
& Boyer, 2014; Perry, 2017). As such, any national and local relief efforts and plans, should 
take account of the motivation and capacity of a range of organizations who can play a role in 
immediate relief and longer-term relief where that is required. This suggest that a 
combination of top-down and bottom-top approaches to responding to emergencies could 
potentially be one way forward. However, this is not without its challenges especially with 
the lingering ambiguity around the notion resilience, and the confusion that comes with this 
in operationalising community resilience in practice. These challenges are discussed in an 
upcoming paper by the authors of this report. 
 
Key Messages for National Policy-makers and Resilience Practitioners 
1. Lessons from Katrina show that having structures and plans in place does not 
guarantee effective implementation of the emergency plans. For this to be 
effective, it would require closer coordination of plans and communication at all 
stages of disaster management and between the different emergency and public 
agencies, public and private organisations and the different communities who are 
deemed to be at risk. 
 
2. There is the need to ensure that risk and resilience policies are not just focusing 
on the impact of risk, but also taking into consideration the likelihood of that 
occurring. At present, a lot of funding is been channelled towards counter-terrorism 
at the different governance levels. While this is important considering the fear and 
public outrage associated with such events, we need to ensure that other areas of 
safety concerns are not neglected as this could have implication for resilience 
planning and developments. Policy makers need to ensure a fair and balanced 
allocated of resources to the different domains of risk as identified in the local risk 
register.  
 
3. Learning and identifying gaps in current resilience and response practices is key to 
building community resilience (before an event) and in organizing an effective 
response strategy; we do not need to reinvent the wheel. Consequently, resilience 
practitioners should consider developing and taking forward a framework for 
learning from prior events and simulation exercises (such as Hurricane Pam). This 
will enable them assess their practices but also organize improvement efforts into 
existing processes and practices. 
 
4. A much stronger ‘can do’ attitude is needed amongst government agencies and 
resilience practitioner to take forward lessons learned and to support the 
development of appropriate and timely policies where required. This is important if 
we are to avoid the incomplete implementation of lesson learned as seen in the case of 
Katrina. 
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